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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, with the
Honorable John Rokich, District Court Judge Presiding,
to the Utah Court of Appeals and is authorized pursuant to 78-2a-3
(2) (i) of the Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1992.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

When the receiving spouse is residing with a member

of the opposite sex, and engaging in sexual relations, no
alimony whatsoever, should be ordered.

The standard of review,

is a question of fact and is to be reviewed for correctness,
with a presumption that the lower Court was dorrect in its
analysis.

Berube vs. Fashion Centre, Ltd. 771 P. 2d 1033

(Utah 1989) .
2.

No alimony should be awarded to the Plaintiff as

the Court made no findings supporting the basis for tiie same.
The standard of review is a question of law, and reviewed
for correctness with no deference to the lower court's
determination.

Berube vs. Fashion Centre Ltd. 771 P. 2d

1033, (Utah 1989).
3.

Not only did the lower Court fail to make appropriate

Findings of Fact, it failed to actually consider the appropriate
criteria for an award of alimony.

The standard of review

if a question of an abuse of discretion.
P. 2d 1166, (Utah App. 1990).

Burt vs. Burt, 799

4.

It was a clear abuse of discretion to award the

Plaintiff with permanent alimony.
abuse of discretion.

The Standard of Review is an

Stevens vs. Stevens, 754 P. 2d 952, (Utah

App. 1988).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES:
30-3-5(6) Utah Code Annotated:
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex. However,
if it is further established by the person receiving
alimony that that relationship or association is
without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall
resume.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A~)*3ellant submits that it was clear abuse of discretion
to award permanent alimony is a four year ten month marriage.
It is true that one of the purposes of alimony is to ensure
that the receiving spouse is not on the public dole. However,
in this case, the receiving spouse was residing with a member
of the opposite sex, and admitted to having sexual relations
with him.
The lower Court failed to make appropriate FINDINGS OF
FACT, supporting an award of alimony, but moreover failed
to appropriately apply the said criteria in determining alimony.
Then clearly abused its discretion in making the same
permanent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from
a determination in the Third Judicial District Oourt, that the
Appellant pay permanent alimony to an ex-wife of a marriage
that lasted four years and ten months, when the ex-wife is
living with a member of the opposite sex, and engaging in
sexual relations.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff filed an action in the Third Judicial District
Court, in an for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to dissolve
the marriage between herself and husband.

The matter came

on for trial for two half days on December 5, and December 6,
1991, before the Honorable John Rokich District Court Judge
Presiding.

DISPOSITION AT THE TRIAL COURT
The District Court awarded the Plaintiff permanent alimony
from which the Appellant now appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The parties began having sexual relations while in high
School,

(T-9.) W h i c h r e s u l t e d

in the P l a i n t i f f hprnminor rk-rocrnnnt-

before either party had finished high school.

(T-10 and 109).

Each of the parties then completed high school after
they were married and their first child was born six months
after they were married. (T-10).
Plaintiff thereafter had two more children, (twins), while
the Defendant went on to college part time.

Defendant attended

college for five years, and was a Junior at the time of divorce,
and had

topped out on the pay acalo for a painter at $9.00

per hour. (T-209).
Plaintiff worked during the marriage selling shoes, and
was making $5.00 an hour at the time that she stopped working,
even though she would have been making as much as $8.00 per hour
had she stayed working where she was, and perhaps even become
a manager and making $18,000.00 to $20,000.00 per year.

(T. 215)

At the time of trial Plaintiff admitted that a male
friend with whom she was having sex , (T-45) had moved his
television into the parties home some ten months before trial,
as well as other living room furniture.

In addition, this male

friend had moved his belongings into the garage at about the
same time.

(T. 47)

In addition, Plaintiff testified that his truck has
been parked in the garage some five or six months before trial,
and that she regularly drove the same. (T-48)

A mutual friend testified that Plaintiff and this male
friend were living together, as did the Defendant testify that
that was what the Plaintiff had told him.
The Court heard the testimony of the parties regarding
alimony, and marital debts etc., and ultimately awarded the
Plaintiff permanent alimony in the sum of $200.00

per month.

From this determination the Defendant now appeals:

ARGUMENT ONE
WHEN THE RECEIVING SPOUSE IN RESIDING WITH A MEMBER
OF THE OPPOSITE SEX, AND ENGAGING IN SEXUAL RELATIONS
NO ALIMONY WHATSOEVER, SHOULD BE ORDERED.
In this case, there

can be no question that the

Plaintiff was residing with a member of the opposite sex and
that they were having sexua] relations.
A }ourg man by the name of Rick Onesto, moved his
furniture into the home of the Plaintiff, which has been mingled
with the furniture that the Plaintiff was awarded in the divorce
action.

He has his television, which is used from day to day,

by the Plaintiff and the parties children. (T-45), while the one
that was awarded to the Plaintiff in the divorce action, is
five years old, and so it is not being used. (T-201).
In addition to the television set which has been mingled
into the personal property awarded to the Plaintiff in the action,
this young man has other furniture which has been mingled into
the same. (T-45).
In fact, this young man's furniture was moved in some
ten months or so before the divorce was finalized. (T-46).
In addition to the foregoing, this young man has used
the garage for storage of his personal items. (T-47).
Not only has this young man been residing in the home
of Plaintiff's, as reflected in moving his furniture in, but
he in fact, does his laundry there, as testified by the Plaintiff.
(T-45).

At the time of trial, Defendant called as a witness a
Mr. Eric Roos, who was very good friends of both the Plaintiff
and the Defendant, as well as the Plaintiff's new found love,
Rick Onesto.
Beginning at page 118, of the transcript, Eric Roos,
testified on direct examination as follows:
Q.

Do you know the parties in this action?

A

Yes.

Q

How long have you knoxm the parties in this action?

A

Approximately five years.

Q

Five Years?

A

Getting close to that.

Q

Almost the entire marriage in this case?

A

Close. I don't know exactly how long they were
married before we met.

Q.

You don't take sides in this particular action,
do you?

A.

I care about the both of these guys and I -- They're
my best friends I had, both of them.

Q.

Have you had occasion to observed whether or not
the Plaintiff in this case, Uendy Weaver, has had
someone living in the home where she presently
resides?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Over what period of time?

A.

Since when I found out about the two had split up
and what had --

Q.

I don't want to lead you here, but let me get to
the bottom line. Would that be at or abcut the
fall of last year until now?

A.

Somewhere in there, yeah.

I --

Are tell me why and how frequently that would be?
I have friends that live near Wendy and they watch
our kids. We bring them there in the morning and
pick them up in the afternoon, and we would spend
weekends with them.
Would you have occasion then to see cars, for examp
parked at the home of Wendy, and whoever, there day
-to-day?
Yeah.

The corner house, almost corner house.

Are you familiar with a gentleman's truck, gentleman and truck by the name of Rick Onesto?
Yeah.
How do you know Rick?
Good friends, too. We were all living together
and we were all the best of friends, all of us
were.
Let me clarify a point, if I might. Do you have
a sitter that's at or about the same general
vicinity of where Wendy resides?
Yeah.
In addition to that, are you saying that you're
Rick and Wendy's as well as Tom Weaver's good
friend?
Yes, I am.
And are you telling me that you do things socially
with Wendy and Rick?
We used to quite often.
Well, not now with Wendy
and Rick so much anymore. Or Tom, I haven't seen
as much of Tom. I seen Wendy and Rick mostly.
Are you familiar with the truck that Mr. Onesto
drives?
Yeah.
Could you describe that, quickly.
Ford Bronco, light blue, two-tone silver blue.
Kow do you know that belongs to him?

He's had it since we lived in Villa Franche
Apartments, approximately two or three years ago.
When you go by to drop your children off in the
mornings, what time frame are we talking about?
It's usually about 3 o'clock.
Okay.
Well, probably -- usually around 7:30, sometimes
8:00.
Are there times that you're there earlier than 7:30?
Yes.
How early would that be at times?
Sometimes 6:30. It all depends on what time I
have to get to work.
Do you pick the children up as well?
Yes.
What time did you pick the children up?
Sometimes about, depending on if I stay late,
could be 6 o'clock.
In reference to Rick Oneoto and Wendy Weaver sociall
what times would you have been with the two of them?
Mostly they came up and visited my house when they'r
done -- my wife, we come over and say Hi, a couple
of times.
When you do things socially does that ever go into
the evenings?
No.
Do you ever go over to her home and watch videos?
No.
Okay. Let me clarify. From the fall of last year
until now, has there ever been any period of time
where you could conclude that their blue bronco
wasn't parked at the home weird hours of the day

and night from then until now?
A.

No.

Q.

Have you had occasion to talk to Rick and Wendy
about the fact that they are presently living
together?

A.

Well, they came to my place.
stays.

That's where P.ick

Then on page 126 of the transcript, while still under
direct examination, is the following:
Q.

Have you had occasion to observe whether or not the
Bronco was there at Wendy Weaver's home in the middle
of the night?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Spend weekends drinking --

Mr. Searle:
dire or --

Tell me about that, real quickly.

Your Honor, I object uo the effective voir

THE COURT: He can answer.
Mr. Searle:
THE COURT:
Q.

Objection.

Lack of foundation, Your Honor.

Okay. Lay a foundation.

(BY MR. WALSH)

When was this, Mr. Roos?

A.

We drink every weekend, play family feud and pictionary until two, three in the morning, regularly.

Q.

Okay. Late at night. So did you have occasion to
go by the home then two or three in the morning,
like from weekend to weekend?

A.

Yeah. We drive -- we pull out of the driveway; it's
right where you can see it.

Q.

And did you or did you not observe the Bronco, at
two or three in the morning each weekend?

A.

Yeah, I seen the Bronco there. Whether he was there
or not, that I can't say. But the Bronco was there.

Lastly, in reference to this witness he testified, on

redirect examination at page 131 of the transcript as follows:
Q.

Do you see Wendy's car there at the same time that
you see Rick Onestofs truck there?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Do you -- as you sit here and try to best recall
what you observed over this time frame over the last
year plus, can you ever visualize a time when the
truck or car were not both parked there at the same
time?

A.

I guess there would be a few times when one car
is there, or either the Bronco is there.

Q.

What about the majority —

A.

The majority of time, it's there.

excuse me?

In an apparent effort to hide the fact that Rick Onesto,
has been residing with the Plaintiff, Plaintiff testified that
his truck is parked in the garage, and her car is parked on the
street.

(T-47) .
Not only did the Plaintiff admit in court that Rick

Onesto had his furniture there, and his items in storage in the
garage, and that his truck was parked in the garage, and for the
length of time it was, but Defendant himself stated that he refused
to continue to pay for the Plaintiff, once he found out that she
was residing with Rick Onesto.
At page 143, and continuing onto page 144 of the transcript when Plaintiff was being examined by his own counsel is
the following:
Q.

Did you pay rent after December, 1990?

A.

No. I stopped paying it.

Q.

Why?

A.

I found out that Rick had been livino ^-^^^ ~~A

T

felt that why sould I pay for soma other guy
living there.
Q.

How did you know Rick was living there?

A.

From friends that had told me, and Wendy had told
at one time.

Q.

That Rick was there?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When did she tell you that?

A.

This would be shortly after the deer hunt, October,
the end of October.

Q.

Of what year?

A.

That she was seeing him in f90 and he really didn't
-- you know how you kind of brush it off. For sure
I knew in December. I found out in '90, December.
She admitted it and friends were admitting it and
neighbors were admitting it, and 1 just wasn't going
to pay anymore.

When cross examined about not paying for the utilities
anymore, by the Plaintiff's Counsel, Defendant, testified at
page 168 as follows:
Q.

And I think your testimony was that you were being
told by somebody else she was befriended by another
gentlemen, is that a correct statement? That's
what you said, I believe, didn't you?

A.

I wasn't going to pay -- I was going to pay for my
kids, but not Wendy, No, because she was living with
somebody else. I was not going to pay for somebody
else to est my steak, pay for somebody else to live
there.

During further cross examination by Plaintiff's Counsel,
Defendant continued on page 170:

Q.

So you had all this money -- now you object to
taking and paying her anything because you say she
had a man friend?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And this man friend was providing her with what
services that you know?

A.

I don't know whether he was providing her with
anything.

Q.

So you don't know anything at all about what he was
doing concerning the relationship.

A.

He was living there, but I don't know if he was
providing anything.

Q.

How do you know he was living there?

A.

She told me at one time that they were living together.

Q.

Is that the only basis?

A.

Somebody tells you something like that and I guess
you just believe it.

Q.

You assumed, right?

A.

No, she told me.

Under the foregoing facts, there can be no

In whac respect?

question

that the Plaintiff is barred from any alimony whatsoever.
The Utah State Legislature considered this very problem
of the receiving spouse having a member of the opposite sex
free loading on the ex-spouse paying alimony, and mandated the
following in 30-3-5(6) Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1991:
(6)

Any order of the court that a party pay alimony
to a former spouse terminates upon establishment
by the party paying alimony that the former spouse
is residing with a person of the opposite sex.
However, if it is further established by the
person receiving alimony that that relationship
or association is without any sexual contact.

payment of alimony shall resume.
Defendant submits that once the evidence established
that Plaintiff was residing with a member of the opposite sex,
the burden shifted to her, to prove that there was no sexual
contact between herself and her live-in lover, Ps.ick Onesto.
In the case of Hacker vs. Wackey 688 P.2d 533 (Utah
1983) The Utah Supreme Court, stated

-.page 534, regarding this

statute as follows:
The statute placed the initial burden of proof on the
person seeking to avoid alimony to show that the former
spouse is "residing11 with a person of the opposite sex.
Once residence with a person of the opposite sex is
established, alimony obligations are terminated unless
the person receiving alimony can show that the relationship is " without any sexual contact."
At trial, the Plaintiff did not come

forward with any

evidence that there was no sexual contact, and put no evidence,
whatsoever to that effect.
Rather, Plaintiff herself testified that she had engaged
in sexual relations with Rick Onesto on page 46, on cross
examination by Defendant's Counsel:
Q.

In fact you have had relations with this guy, have
you not?

A.

Yes, I have.

Defendant submits that all he need do to prevail on
the issue of alimony is establish that Plaintiff is residing
with a member of the opposite sex.
That is to say, he does not need to come forward and
establish that in addition to residing with a member of the

opposite sex she is having sexual relations with him.
Rather it is her burden to establish that the relationship is " without any sexual contact,

fl

after Defendant has

established that Rick Onesto resides with her.
In this case, Defendant not only established that she
was residing with a member of the opposite sex, but Defendant
also established by way of the Plaintiff herself, that she and
Rick Onesto were having sexual relations.
Surely, there is no basis to award her alimony at all.
The case at bat, is easily distinguishable from the
case of Knuteson vs. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, ( Utah, 1980),
decided by the Utah Supreme Court three years earlier than the
Wacker case cited above.
In Knuteson, the husband refused to pay Court ordered
alimony leaving the wife in a destitute set of circumstances,
where she had to reach out for help from a male friend, and in
fact never resided with the said male friend, even though they
had engaged in sexual relations.
At page 1389, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Other and perhaps more cogent and realistic reasons
to affirm the trial court's decision to the effect that
Mrs. Knuteson was not a ''resident1' in Gay Conder' s home
in the statutory sense, is that she expended much of her
efforts in the daytime at her own home doing chores and
yard work; and secondly, the wording of the statute does
not appear to cover a temporary stay at another's house.
This latter reason is furnished by defendant's counsel
himself, who says in his brief that Webster's new
Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd Edition, defines
the word "reside" as: To dwell permanently or for a
length of time; to have a settled abode for a time,
(emphasis original).

In the case at bar, the Plaintiff herself testified that
Rick Onesto had his furniture in her home since February, had
stored his things in the garage since that time, and that she
had been driving his truck since July.

Trial in this case

occured on December 5 and 6, 1991, so the furniture would have
been

in her home for going on ten months, and the personal items

in the garage for going on ten months, and driving his vehicle
had been going on for more than five months.
There

can be no question that Rick Onesto resided with

the Plaintiff in the statutory sense, and that no alimony should
be awarded.

This is particularly so, because in additon to the

fact that Mr. Onesto is residing in the home of the parties,
Plaintiff and Mr. Onesto, are living as man and wife, having
sexual relations.
The very policy that the State Legislature intended
is perhaps best noted in the testimony of the Defendant where
he stated on page 168:
I wasn't going to pay -- I was going to pay for my
kids, but not Wendy, because she was living with somebody also. I was not going to pay for somebody else
to eat my steak, pay for somebody else to live there.
That by virtue of the foregoing, the Defendant requests
that this Court reverse the lower Court, and eliminate alimony
all together in this action.

ARGUMENT TWO

NO ALIMONY SHOULD BE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AS
THE COURT MADE NO FINDINGS SUPPORTING THE BASIS FOR
THE SAME

The lower Court made the following FINDINGS CF FACT, as
they apply to the payment of alimony by the Defendant:
#3.

Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other
on the 30 day of November, 1985, in Boise, Idaho,
and are presently husband and wife.

#8.

That the defendant is gainfully employed and earned
as an employee of Universal Painting during 1990,
the gross yearly sum of $15,296 and presently earns
the gross amount of #1387.00 monthly.

#10. Plaintiff is entitled to child support and alimony.
The FINDINGS OF FACT are LOtally void of an> determination
by the lower Court as to (1) the financial conditions and
needs of the receiving spouse and (2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to produce sufficient income for herself.
For the purposes of appeal, the "findings of fact must
show that decree follows logically from, and is supported by
the evidence.'1

Morgan vs. Morgan, 795 P. 2d 684 (Utah App. 1990).

The lower Court is required to go through a three prong
analysis, in awarding alimony:
1.
spouse;

The financial conditions and needs of the receiving

2.

The ability of the receiving spouse to produce a

sufficient income for herself, and
3.

The ability of the responding spouse to provide

support.
Note Thomson vs. Thomson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991).
In the case of Bell vs. Bell, 810 P.2d 38^, 492,
(Utah App. 1991), this court stated:
Failure to consider the (three material) factors
in fashioning an alimony award constitutes an abuse
of discretion. See Stevens vs Stevens, 754 P.2d
952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Paffell vs. Paffel,)
trial court must make sufficently detailed findings
of fact on each factor to enable a reviewing court
to ensure that the trial court's discretionary
determination was rationally based upon these three
factors. See Davis vs. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648,
(Utah, 1988); Stevens vs. Stevens,754 P.2d at
958-59; see also Acton vs. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996
999 (Utah 1987) . If sufficient findings are not
made, we must reverse unless the record is clear
and uncontroverted such as to allow us to apply
the Jones factors as a matter of law on appeal.
See Asper vs. Asper, 753 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988).
The failure of the lower Court to analyze the needs
of the wife, and the failure of the lower Court ot analyze her
ability to provide for herself, each independantly, constitute
an abuse discretion.
"Failure to analyze the parties' circumstances in light
of these three factors constitutes an abuse of discretion/'
Thomson vs. Thomson, 810 P.2d 428 ( Utah App. 1991.)
Not only must the lower Court specifically make the
requisite FINDINGS £o? the Appellate Court to ensure that the
trial Court's discretionary determination was rationally based
on the three stated criteria, it is critically necessary for

the lower Court to make the said FINDINGS with sufficient detail,
and which consist of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the steps
the Court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue
presented.

Sampinos vs. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615 (Utah App. 1988).

Appellant respectfully submits that there can be no
question that this Court must reverse the lower Court. Note
Burt vs. Burt,

799 P.2d 1166, (Utah App. 1990.), also Canning

vs. Canning;, 744 P.2d 325, (Utah App. 1987) also Noble vs. Noble,
761 P.2d 1369, (Utah, 1988), also Ruhsam vs, Ruhsam,

742 P.2d 123,

(Utah App. 1987) and lastly Rudman vs. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) .
Not only did the lower Court fail to even make a
reference in the FINDINGS as to the financial conditions and
needs of the receiving spouse as well as the ability of the
raceiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for herself
the FINDINGS are absolutely void of any factors that enable
a reviewing Court to determine if the trial court's discretionary
determination was rationally based.
In addition there are no detail whatsoever nor any
subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the Court took to reach
its conclusion regarding the needs and ability of the receiving
spouse.
Appellant submits that this Court must reverse the
determination made by the lower Court, as there is no basis

for an award of any alimony, under the present set of
circumstances.

ARGUMENT THREE
NOT ONLY DID THE LOWER COURT FAIL TO MAKE APPROPRIATE
FINDINGS OF FACT, IT FAILED TO ACTUALLY CONSIDER THE
APPROPRIATE CRITERIA FOR AN AWARD OF ALIMONY.

In this case, the Court not only failed to fashion
appropriate FINDINGS OF FACT, regarding the three requirements
for the award of alimony, the lower Court failed to appropriately
consider the same in its award.
In the case of Watson vs. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, (Utah App.
1992), this Court stated at page 3:
In formulating alimony awards, the trial
broad discretion, and its decisions will
overturned absent an abuse of discretion
injustice. See Schindler vs. Schindler,
90 (Utah App. 1989). In Schindler, this
outlined the factors to be considered by
in determining alimony:

court has
not be
or manifest
776 P.2d 84,
court
a trial court

In awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial
court to consider each of the following three factors:
(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse; (2) The ability of the receiving spouse to
produce sufficient income for him or herself; and (3)
the ability of the responding spouse to provide support.
If these three factors have been considered, we will
not distrub the trial court's alimony award unless
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion. The ultimace test of an
alimony award is whether the party receiving alimony
will be able to support him or herself "as nearly
as possible to the standard of living . . . .enjoyed
during the marriage.11 English vs. English, 565 P. 2d
409, 411 (Utah 1977).

As to the first cirteria, the Court failed to consider
the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse.
In thit: ca^e the Plaintiff was to begin her life
after the divorce, with no debt whatsoever.

While the

Defendant was to pay of all of the marital debt of the parties
in the sum of $12,434.35, which was to pay off at the rate of
$322.15 per month, as reflected on Defendant's Exhibit 9-D.
In addition, the Plaintiff was awarded the personal
property in the sum of $4,955.00, which did not include the
award of the car to her.

While the Defendant was awarded

personal property in the sum of $600.00, which sum included his
Mazda Pickup Truck, in the sum of $500.00. Note Defendant's
Exhibit #13-D and Defendant's Exhibit 14-D.
Defendant was awarded his 1986 Mazda Pickup Truck, which
had 130,000 miles on it, bubject ot the indebtedness if any on
the same, (T-153), and the Plaintiff in turn was awarded her
1980 Buick Skylark, free and clear of any debt, and the Defendant
was tc pay the $3,100.00 owing on the same, (T-19)
Hence, wholly in addition to the foregoing debt service
of $12,434.35, the Defendant was required to pay the $3,100.00
for the car at $50.00 per month, to Defendant's father. (T-20)
Since the Plaintiff failed to disclose all the sums
she received from the Defendant to Recovery Services, he not
only ended up paying her substantial sums to support herself
and the children, he<- ended up owing the sum of $3,300.00 to
ilecovery Services. (T-69)
In addition to the foregoing the Court did not eet a

clue from the Plaintiff as tc her real needs, as Plaintiff's
Exhibit #21-P reflects needs, etc., based on the fact that the
Plaintiff is on public assistance, with Medicaid suppling medical
and dental care.
This coupled with the fact, that the Court was never given
any evidence of what was required to maintain the Plaintiff's
household, as: thxougiithe marriage of the parties the Defendant's
folks contributed "assistance and help" as did the Plaintiff's
folks.
In fact, a fair amount of the trial surrounded the various
loans that the Defendant had taken out with his father. (T-48)
As noted on page 156-157, the Defendant testified on
examination by his

own counsel as follows:

Q.

Now, you heard her testify yesturday that she has
$410 coming for your children from welfare, is that
correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

She's getting another $60.00 over and above what
she gets for child care. So total welfare payments
are approximately $470 a month.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is that correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.

In addition she has $300 in food stamps. Did you
hear her testify about: that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Approximately $700, plus or minus?

A.

Correct.

Q.

Are you telling me that on top of that you are
paying her $6,000 from August 1 until now that has
nothing to so with that $700 that she's getting
from public assistance?

A.

Yes.

Q.

It is your testimony that on top of all that, she's
run up accounts which are the subject of these other
exhibits here where she geus demand letters from the
University of Utah Credit Union, and Sears, etcetera,
etcetera, etcetera?

A.

That' s correct.

In additional places it was clearly established at the
time of trial that the Plaintiff was getting money or having
her rent paid, etc., at the same time that she was getting public
assistance from Recovery Srecives.

Mote for example the

transcript at page 169 and 170.
Bottomline, the Court was totally in the dark as to what
the needs were of the receiving spouse, because she was getting
so much money and from so many sources, yet testifying in her
own behalf that she was getting little or nothing, and that
was why she was on welfare.
When questioned with cancelled checks, however, the
Plaintiff admitted that she had in fact received various sums
but could not just remember the same.
On page 64 of the transcript, on cross examination she
stated:

Q.

So when you testified earlier today that he didnft
give you any money either immediately before the
time or after the time you separated, that is not
true, is it Wendy?

A.

You could say, no, it's not true. He did give me
a certain portion of funds until -- as you notice
that they stopped in December.

Q.

Can you tell me what other funds he paid you?

A.

What other funds he paid me?

I don't remember.

Hence, the lower Court heard evidence that he paid
nothing, by the Plaintiff.

Then the Court heard that he paid

various amounts, but Plaintiff could not remember all of what
they were.

Then the Defendant testified that he gave her as

much as $6,000.00.

In addition, the Defendant presented Exhibit

#9-D showing that she had run up certain bills with charge cards,
etc., in the sum of $12,434.35.

In addition, the lower Court

heard that she was receiving $410.00 for public assistance for
the children, and an additional $60.00

for herself, coupled

with food stamps in the sum of $308.00. (T-41)
Bottomline, the Court heard not only conflicting evidence
that one would expect in any trial, but testimony that was
recanted, almost completely.

All from the Plaintiff.

In addition thereto, the Defendant placed into evidence
substantial sums that the Defendant has been receiving, but
not disclosing to the State.
Through the two versions of the evidence, it was not
disputed that the Plaintiff was receiving $778.00 in public
assistance and food stamps.

As a result, with this great divergence in the evidence
the Court was faced with deciding what

ff

the financial conditions

and needs of the receiving spouse11 were.
However, no where in the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW or DECREE OF DIVORCE is there a clue.
Hence, there is no bisis as a matter of practicality,
for an award of $200.00 per month alimony to the Plaintiff,
based upon th financial conditions

and needs of the Plaintiff.

Not only did the lower Court fail to address the financial

conditions

and needs of the Plaintiff, the Court similarly

failed to address the ability of the receiving spouse to produce
sufficient income for herself.
As a matter of fact, Plaintiff became pregnant while
in high school, however, graduated from high school after the
parties were married.

(T-9 and 10)

Plaintiff was not only capable of working, she worked
during the parties marriage, as reflected on Exhibit 3-P.
fact, she worked even while was pregnant.

(T-38)

In

At times

she worked a full 40 hour week. (T-38)
Plaintiff started out working at $4.50 an hour, but
increased in salary to $5.00 per hour in 1989, when she stopped
working.
At the end of trial, the parties stipulated to Defendant's
father's testimony, as was proffered into evidence, as follows
at page 215 of the transcript:

Mr. Tom Weaver, Sr., would testify he employed
Wendy Weaver at times and found her to be an outstanding
employee with qualifications in sales. And he would
testify she would draw a wage at $8.00 an hour, and
by now, if she continued to work for him, she would
be making in excess of what Tom Weaver makes, and
she would be a managar drawing between 18 and
$20,000.00.
The lower Court totally ignored the Plaintiff's ability
to work, and assist in the total financial picture.
However, the lower Court heard the Plaintiff testify in
several places that she needed the marital car, so she could
get a job.

Note for example the transcript at page 21 and 58.

The lower Court then gives her the car, so she can get
a job, but totally ignores her own ability to produce sufficient
income for herself and then on top of all of this makes the
Defendant pay for her car. (T-52)
Plaintiff even testified that she was attempting to
find work, at page 59 is the following on Cross Examination:
Q.

Are you applying now for work?

A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

Where have you applied?

A.

I have applied at Zions First National bank and
applied at West One bank, and I would have had the
job at West One Bank, but they did not hire
relatives. I applied at key Bank. I walked
through the mall and applied at malls, Shcpko.
I'm willing to take just about anything.

Q.

If you would have been accepted at West One, what
would you have done at West One?

A.

Bank Telling.

Q.

And how much would you make as a Bank Teller?

A.

How much would I make as a Bank Teller? Six dollars
to start.

Q.

Would that be a 40-hour week?

A.

Forty-hour week.

Defendant respectfully submits that there is not even
a clue, that the lower Court considered these facts, in awarding
a permanent alimony to the Plaintiff of $200.00 per month.
Lastly, as to the last inquiry of the three prong
test, ie

"the ability of the responding spouse to provide

support1/ the only clue is a blank statement of his gross earnings
as found in FINDING OF FACT #8, which states:
8. That the defendant is gainfully employed and
earned as an employee of Universal Painting during
1990, the gross yearly sum of $15,29b and presently
earns the gross amount of $1,387.00 monthly.
The court made no finding as to his net income, nor is
there any basis to conclude that the Court considered the fact
that the Defendant's wages were being garnished for back child
support from Recovery Services, for a time when he was paying
the Plaintiff directly, but she did not disclose the same.
Futhermore, there is no clue that the Court considered
what his income had done historically.

It is interesting

to note that by the Plaintiff's own exhibits, Defendants income
actually decreased from the years 1989 to 1990.

Note Exhibit

#3-P which shows income for 1989 from wages,etc. at $16,457.44,
and Exhibit #4-P which shows income for 1990 for wages, etc.
at $15,296.50.
As a result, it appears that with the $1,387.00 per month

as reflected in FINDING OF FACT #8, which was a gross wage,
the Defendant was to pay child support of $410.00, pay for recovery
services in the sum of $3,300.00 total; pay insurance for the
minor children (T-221); pay for the car that the Plaintiff was
awarded in the sum of $3,100.00 (although she is awarded the
car); pay for all of the marital debt that the parties had
accumulated in the sum of $12,434.35, and then before he had one
dime for himself, he was to pay the Plaintiff the sum of
$200.00 per month as permanent alimony.
This is riot a case like the Court sees all of the time, where
there just is not enough to go around.
This is a case where the Plaintiff just has to work, and
there is no question about it.
If she had continued to work, she would be making more
than the Defendant at upwards of $20,000.00 per year, which was
all undisputed. (T-215)
On the otherhand, here is a young man that is already
struggling to get back, working just as much as he possibly can.
(T-95)
This young man has been driving without car insurance
since April, some eight months plus before trial (T-99).
Defendant respectfully submits that in applying the
standards set down in Watson supra, this is not a case where
alimony is appropriate, and absolutely not a case for permanent
alimony.

ARGUMENT FOUR
IT WAS CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO AWARD
THE PLAINTIFF WITH PERMANENT ALIMONY
From the time that the paruies had to get married,
November 1985 (t-187) to the time that she filed for divorce,
September 1990, (T-7), the parties were married some 4 years
and ten months, or so.
During that period of time the parties had done a
lot of growing up, as they both were in High School when they
got married. (T-10 and 109).
Plaintiff had completed High School after getting married,
(T-10) and the Defendant was still a Junior and had not even
began working on his major, ie: Accounting. (T-192).
Defendant submits that it was clear abuse of discretion
to award permanent alimony.
it is true that length of the marriage is not zhe only
factor in considering alimony. Surely it is a factor however.
Note Boyle vs. Boyle, 735 P. 2d 669, (Utah App. 1987)
In addition, alimony was never intended to be a punishment nor a reward.

Note Gramme vs. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, (Utah

1978) also Turner vs. Turner,

649 P.2d 6, (Utah 1982).

One of the purposes of alimony, is to "enable

the

receiving spouse to maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard
of living enjoyed during the marriage, and (prevent) the receiving
spouse from becoming a public charge.1* Munns vs. Munns, 790 P2d
116, 121 (Utah App. 1990) .

Note also, Paffel vs. Paffel, 732 P. 2d 96, (Utah 1986)
Bushell vs. Bushell, 649 P. 2d 85, (Utah 1982); Burt vs. Burt,
799 P.2d 1166, (Utah App. 1990); Talley vs. Talley, 739 P. 2d
83, (Utah App. 1987); Georgedes vs. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44,
(Utah 1981) and Fletcher vs. Fletcher, 615 T.2d 1218, (Utah 1980).
Defendant respectfully submits that this may be exactly
what the Court has caused rather than cured.
In this case the Plaintiff was reveiving $410.00 for the
three children on public assistance.

(T-40) and she was receiving

$60.00 for herself from public assistance, (T-40).
In addition to the same she was receiving $308.00 in food
stamps, (T-41), for a total of $778.00 from public assistance.
Defendant on the other hand is ordered to pay $410.00
as and for child support, and the sunn of $200.00 permanent
alimony.
On the conclusion of the trial, at page 220, of the
transcript is the following:
MR. WALSH:

Your Honor, are you going to make a determination on alimony and for how long?

THE COURT:

Alimony would be permanent. That will be
permanent is this case. I make the --

MR. WALSH:

For the rest of her life?

THE COURT:

So long as she's unmarried.

MR. WALSH:

And in what amount?

THE COURT:

I said I wouldn't make that determination
until I have had an opportunity to go-I ! m going to do through this, and she'll
be awarded alimony, no question about that.
I just want to know whether it can be
retroactive or not.

Then as noted in paragraph #2 of the Decree of Divorce,
the Defendant was to pay alimony in the sum of $200.00 forever:
#2. Plaintiff is awarded the sum of $200 a month
permanent alimony due and payable each month commencing and payable on or before the 6th day of
each month with first payment payable on or before
the 6th of January, 1992.
Under the facts of this case, one hundred per cent of
any and all sums paid by the Defendant go to the State of Utah,
to recover che $778.00 they supply in public assistance.
As noted above Defendant pays $410 for child support
and the sum of $200.00 alimony, for a total support obligation
of $610.00.
However, Plaintiff actually gets more from public assistance and therefore would take the $778.00 from public assistance than the $610.00 from the Defendant as support.
Under the present arrangement by the Court, the Plaintiff
has a motive in which to remain on public assistance, and the
Defendant is forever strapped where he can not complete his
education, and struck at $9.00 per hour.
Defendant called Dennis

Boyd as an Expert Witness, who

testified on page 209 as follows:
Q.

In reference to pay, excuse me, if Tom Weaver were
to say he made $9.00 an hour, would you say thatfs
on the bottom or top of the pay scale?

A

I would say that's on the top of the pay scale.

Q

Do you have employees yourself?

A

Yes, I do.

Q

How many employees?

A

At different times I have had as many as 32 working

for me at one time.
three employees.

Presently, right now, I have

Q.

Do you have any employees that make $9 or more?

A.

Mo, I do not.

As noted above, alimony should not be a punishment
or reward and is intended to prevent the receiving spouse from
becoming a public charge.
Alimony on the other hand, should enable the Plaintiff
to maintain, nearly as possible, a standard of living that was
enjoyed during the marriage.
Mote Davis vs. DaVis, 749 P. 2d 647, (Utah 1938),
Fletcher vs. Fletcher, 615 ?. 2d 1213, (Utah 1930); Gardner
vs. GarlTrfey, 748 P. 2d 1076, (Utah 1983); Georgedes vs. Georgedes,
627 P. 2d 44, (Utah 1981); Faffel vs. Paffel, 732 P. 2d, 69,
(Utah 1986); Ueppson vs. Jeppsoh, 634 P. 2d 69, (Utah 1984);
Bushell vs. Bushell, 649 P. 2d 85, (Utah 1932); Burt vs. Burt,
799 P. 2d 1166, (Utah App. 1990) and Talley vs. Talley, 739 P.
2d 33, (Utah App. 1987).
The difficulty that this Court has is in determining
what the standard of living was during the course of the parties
marriage, because the parties from the very beginning were in
debt beyond their control, and both sets of parents helped in
no small way.

Each of the parties testified how they had borrowed
more money and more money, from the respective parents.
At page 20 of the transcript, the Plaintiff testified:
We borrowed $6,000.00 from his father and he put us
on a time payment of $50.00 a month for the next ten
years. And we paid off several other outstanding
bills with that also.
Again on page 57, the Plaintiff testified on cross
examination:
Q.

Now, itfs also fair to say that Tom had a loan
with his parents to help with school, did he not?

A.

School and family expenses.

Q.

And it's fair to say that Tom had been going to
school and paying for tuition and books and
other things out of that account, isn't that
correct?

A.

Ye§. And we also paid other things from that
account.

Defendant Tom Weaver, tesuified in reference to Exhibit
#8-D on page 101 and 102 as follows:
Q.

Let's go over this real quickly. It has already
been admitted, so we have it clear as to what
this represents. It shows a loan or a beginning
money amount of $6,000 on the 26th day of
June of last year. Do you recall that?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

Where did you borrow the money?

A.

From

Q.

Did you normally sign a written agreement with your
father with reference to this loan?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have you been making payments on that loan?

A.

I have.

my father.

For a while I couldn't make payments.

I

just didn'.t have the money so-- but 1 think three months
ago I started making payments again. There's
payments made all along. Part of it was from this
money. I have to take out of this because I can't
make it off my payroll.
Q.

I'll come back to that in a minute.
the $6,000.00 go for?

What did

A.

It was a consolidation of, I think, our Sears,
Master card and University Credit Union overdraft
and stereo, home stereo and the car.

Not only did the parties borrow from the Defendant
parents to maintain their standard of living, the Plaintiff's
folks also helped substantially. (T-15) .
Defendant respectfully submits that it is impossible
to determine alimony based upon the standard of living
analysis, since the standard of living was based upon borrowing
money form the respective parents, writing bad checks, credit
cards to the limit, etc.
Defendant submits that the correct analysis is for the
Court

to

equalize the parties standard of living after divorce.
Note Maxwell vs. Maxwell, 754 P. 2d 84, (Utah App. 1988)

Olson vs. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, (Utah 1985) Higley vs. Higley,
676 P. 2d 379, (Utah 1983); Rasband vs, Rasband, 752 P. 2d
1331, (Utah App. 1988) and Howell vs. Howell, 806 P. 2d 109 (Utah
App. 1991.) .
Under this analysis the Court should look at his
present income

of $1,387.00 gross per month.

After appropriate

taxes, F.I.C.A., which are required by law to be withdrawn, are
taken into account, the Defendant then pays the sum of $410.00
as and for

child support.

Defendant would be required to pay for insurance for the
minor children under 30-3-5, as well as for one half of all
work or education related child care costs.
Plaintiff in turn is contributing to the financial situation between the parties as best she can.
If she is making minimum wage, then she has a gross
income per month of approximately $772.00 per month,
which after taxes etc., places her almost exactly where the
Defendant is after paying his taxes, etc., and the $410.00
per month as and for child support.
This approach does not penalize or reward either party
in the divorce, and creates a situation where Plaintiff is
no longer on public assistance, as she has between $900.00
a month and $1,000.00 a month to live on instead of the $778.00
she gets through public assistance.
Defendant respectfully subnits that it was an abuse
of discretion

to

reward the Plaintiff with the permanent alimony

of $200.00 per month, instead of analyzing the parties financial
condition and then equalizing the same.

CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant submits that there is no basis
for an award of alimony in this case, and especially an
award of permanent alimony.
The parties were married for too short of time, and
each of the parties are in a relative equal position
financially.
The only appropriate way to determine alimony is based
upon the equality of standard of living, after the divorce,
and in using this analysis one ^ets the same result, as they
do, if they consider that she is residing with a member of
the opposite sex and in fact have sexual relations, ie:
no alimony at all.
Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the lower Court determination and hold that
no alimony be required of the Defendant/Appellant.
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E.espectfully submitted this 3rd day oJf-March',' 1993.

JOHN WALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo-.—

T

D E C R E E

WENDY E. WEAVER,

N ' ° Judicial Dtetritt'

FEB 0 7 1992

Plaintiff,
Case No. 904903

-V8-

THOMAS A. WEAVER, JR.,

Judge John Rokich

Defendant.
—oooOooo---

G^v^\
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing in the above entitled Court before the Honorable John Rokich
on the 5 and 6 days of December, 1991, and the plaintiff appearing
in person and represented by counsel, George H. Searle, and defendant
appearing in person and represented by counsel, John Walsh, and both
parties having presented testimony and evidence in support of the
allegations set forth in their respective pleadings, the Court now
being fully advised in the premises and having heretofore made and
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That the plaintiff, Wendy Weaver be and she is

hereby and herewith granted and awarded a divorce, dissolving the
marriage contract and bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between
plaintiff and defendant, Thomas A. Weaver, Jr., said Decree to become

absolute and final upon entry by the Court in the register of actions,
2. Plaintiff is awarded the sum of $200 a month permanent
alimony

due and payable each month commencing and payable on or

before the 6 day of each month with first payment payable on or
before the

6 January, 1992.

3.Plaintiff is hereby and herewith awarded the care, custody
and control of the three minor children: Ashley Elaine Weaver, Amy
Lynn Weaver and Emily Elizabeth Weaver, subject to reasonable rights
of visitation by the defendant therewith at reasonable times and
places.
4. Defendant is ordered to pay directly to plaintiff child
support money in the amount as currently or hereafter in the future
determined by the Utah Child Support Guidelines presently amounting
for the three children to be the sum of $410 each month based upon
defendants income of $1387 gross a month. If defendant becomes delinquent in his child support obligation, in an amount at

least equal

to child support payable for one month, then plaintiff shall

be

entitled to mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to State
law. This income withholding procedure shall apply to existing and
future payors.
5.Further, the defendant shall provide for the maintenance
and support of the said minor children until each attain the age of
majority as follows:
(a) Obtain, carry and provide reasonable Hospital,medical,

-J2-

and dental insurance for the benefit and future protection of
the said minor children.
6. During the course of the marriage relationship, the
parties have acquired personal property. Said personal property
of the parties is awarded and shall be distributed as follows:
(a) To the plaintiff, free and clear of any r
title or claim of title by the defendant therein, to-wit:
1980 Buick Skylark vehicle. Serial No. 4B695AW2824233.
Kitchen table and chairs.

Lawn Mower

Living room couch.

Electric Carpet Sweeper

m ui

Camera

i

Table lamp.
Lamp with stand.
Television
Mic ro wave oven
Stereo
Ashleys dresser
Twins cribs
Clothes washer
Clothes dryer
(b) To the defendant free and clear of any ri
title or claim of title by the plaintiff therein, to-wit:
Mazda Pickup Truck

Love Seat Couch

T•
A. rr J i_ •
Living room stuffed chair

Toaster

Coffee Table
Living rpom chair
(c) All remaining personal property is awarde
to each of the parties as they now have possession thereof.

7. Defendant be and he is hereby and herewith ordered and
required to pay and hold plaintiff harmless on ^ny *™^-

(1) University of Utah Credit Union debtf.)
(2) Bill Consolidation loan.
(3) Citi Corp Bank Card
(4) Investment loan.
(5) Sears charge account.
(6) State of Utah Recovery Service Judgment
rendered en 19 August, 1991, in office of Recovery Servic^s^Case
No. 62236425 Rl plus accrued amounts owed thereon.
(7) DEbt owed to Bonneville Billing & Co£|ecti/)nj
for non-payment of three unhonored $10 checks.
8. Plaintiff is awarded Judgment for and defenda\nti
ordered to pay the plaintiffs court costs in the amount oX\%ll
cost of Complaint filed and the further sum of $ oiooo

Vrpr

-rr^ being'

a reasonable amount to be awarded for the purpose of assisting the
plaintiff in payment of attorney fees incurred and legal services
rendered in this matter.
9. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the
other such documents as are required to implement the provisions
of the Decree of Divorce entered herein by the Court, including
all documents conveying title to plaintiff of the 1980 Buick Skylark

-4-

Automobile.

£*>„

Dated this

;£ *7

day of December7, 199tU

John Rokich

Mailed a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to:
John Walsh
Attorney at Law
Suite 202 Cove Point Plaza
3865 South Wasatch Blvd.

Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
postage prepaid this pi!3

day of December, 1991.
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George H . Searle 2903
-£09-3 Judicial Distript
Attorney for plaintiff
2805 South State
j/hi U 7 iflop
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
\
^
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IN THE T H I R D J U D I C I A L DISTRICT C O U R T
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
000O000
AT

:

WENDY E . WEAVER,

,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS O F FACT A N D
CONCLUSIONS O F L A W
C a s e N o < 904903802 D A

-V8&
Judge
John Rokiirh
, . , District
n.l:;V
Third Juaiciai

THOMAS A . WEAVER, J R . ,

FEB 0 7 1992

Defendant.
—OOOOOOO—

SALTLM^OUNTY

T h e above entitled matter having come o n ^egtri^r^^oiT'Q^pJ.Tcia.I
trial in the above entitled Court before the Honorable J u d g e
John R o k i c h , on the 5 and 6 days of D e c e m b e r , 1991, and the
plaintiff

appearing in person and represented by c o u n s e l , G e o r g e

H. S e a r l e , and the defendant appearing in person and represented
by c o u n s e l , John

W a l s h , and a l l that appears by the files and

records n e r e i n , each of the parties having presented testimony
and e v i d e n c e in support of the allegations alleged in t h e Complaint
and their respective p l e a d i n g s , the Court n o w being fully advised
in the p r e m i s e s , makes the following:
FINDINGS OB' FACT
l.That this action w a s commenced more than ninety (90) days
prior to the hearing on the 5 and 6 days of D e c e m b e r , 1 9 9 1 .
2. Plaintiff h a s n o w ana for m o r e than th r e e (3) m o n t h s
immediately prior to the commencement of this action been a bona

fide and actual resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3. Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other
on the 30 day of November, 1985, at Boise, Idaho, and are
presently husband and wife.
4. Plaintiff and defendant have had three children born
to them as issue of their marriage, to-wit: Ashley Elaine Weaver,born
18 May, 1986, and twins, Amy Lynn Weaver and Emily Elizabeth Weaver,
born the 18 July, 1990, presently residing with the plaintiff.
*J

5. That for some time prior hereto, the defendant has
treated the plaintiff cruelly, causing irreconsilable differences
to arise as a result of associating with other women in a manner
inconstitent with his marriage obligation to the plaintiff and
failing, after the birth of the twins, to adequately financially
support the plaintiff and the minor children.
6. That plaintiff and defendant have accumulated the
following properety, to-wit:
Kitchen table and chairs
Table lamp
Television
St
ereo
Twins Cribs
Lawn Mower
Camera
Electric Carpet Sweeper

Living room couch
Lamp with stand
Micro Wave Oven
Ashleys dresser
Clothes dryer
Lawn and garden tools
Electric Blender
1980 Buick Skylark Serial
No.4B695AW2824233
Love seat couch
Living Room stuffed chair
Coffee table
Living room chair
Toaster and other miscellaneous personal property in the
possession of
each.
7. That the parties have incurred some mutual and joint
family financial obligations ipc,J udiiift but mui limited to tfr

to-Wlt:

(1) University of Utah Credit Union Debt
(2) Bill Consolidation Loan
(3) City Corp Bank Card
(4) Investment Loan
(5) Sears Charge Ace ount
(6) State of

Utah R ecovery Service Judgment

rendered on 19 Augus t 1991, in office of
Recovery Service, Case No. 62236426 RI.
(7) Debt owed Bonneville Billing and Collections
for Non payment of three unhonored $10 checks,
8. That the defendant is gainfully employed and earned as
an employee of Universal Painting during 1990, the gross yearly.
sum of $15,296 and presently earns the gross amount of $1387 monthly.
9. Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the care,
custody and control of aforesaid refer red to children, subject
to reasonable rights of visitation by the defendant therewith at
all reasonable times and places.
10. Plaintiff is entitled to child support and alimony.
11. The minor children will be in need of future medical,
dental, hospital and health insurance coverage for their benefit
and protection.
12. Defendant will have a retirement benefit

and the

plaintiff is entitled to half the retirement benefit accrued during
the marriage of the parties.
13. Plaintiff has been compelled to empl»an attorney to
represent her in this matter, and is without financial means or
ability to pay for services rendered.

From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That the marital status of the plaintiff and defendant
be terminated and a Decree of Divorce be granted to the plaintiff
as

provided by law, as no useful purpose will be accomplished by

prolonging the marriage longer.
2. The care, custody and control of the three (3) minor
children of the parties should be awarded to the plaintiff subject
to the right of the Defendant to visit said children at reasonable
times and places.
3. Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded all the defendants
right, title and interestin and to the following property free and
clear of any claim of the defendant to-wit:
Kitchen table and chairs, Living room couch, Table lamp,
Lamp with stand, Television , Micro Wave oven, Stereo,
Ashleys dresser, Twins cribs, Cloth es dryer, Clothes Washer
Lawn mower, Electric

Carpet Sweeper, Lawn and Garden tools,

Camera, 1980 Buick Skylark, Serial No. 4B695AW2824233.
and other personal property in her possession and control.
4. Defendant is entitled to be awarded all the plaintiffs
right, title and interest in and to the following, to-wit:
Mazda PickUp Truck, Love seat couch, Living room stuffed
chair, Coffee table, Living room chair, Toaster and other
miscellaneous personal property in his possession and control.
5.Plaintiff is entitled to-receive and defendant should

be ordered to pay permanent alimony in the sum of $200 a month and
child support money to plaintiff in the sum of $410 a month.
6. Defendant should

pay any and all mutual and joint

family financial obligations incurred by the parties hereto-tfu^ing
their marriage and save the other harmless from
creditoro therctyr included and—nefr-4~i^,,fc.<i*i..-..t-g\-..t-.Kg f n l 1 o ^ / k
University of Utah Credit Union debt,
Bill Consolidation Loan
Citi Corp Bank Card
Investment Loan
S^ars Charge Account
State of Utah Recovery Service Judgment rendered on
Aug. 19, 1991, in office of Recovery Service, Case No.
62236426 Rl
Debt owed Bonnevill Billing and Collections for non
payment of three unhonored $10 checks.
7. The defendant should be cbligated to provide for the
benefit and protection of the minor children adequate future medical,
dental, hospital and h ealth insurance coverage.
8. Plaintiff should be awarded one half of his Retirement
funds accrued during the marriage of the parties.
9. Plaintiff is entitled to be awarded a reasonable attorney
fee and costs of Court.
10. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to

-s-

the other such documents as are required to implement the provisons
of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
Dated this

J

day of Po&amtrgT, 19£iL

BY THE COURT

^ -

4

&

JUDGE

Mailed a copy of the foregoing findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law to:
John Walsh, Attorney at Law
Suite 202 Cove Point Plaza
3865 South Wasatch Blvd.
Salt Laek City, Utah 84109
postage prepaid this

i, 22

J

